

## Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY:NEA:TTOMPKINS

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S/S:JHOGANSON

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O 101707Z JUL 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 162139 TOSEC 060044

EXDIS

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT TO SECSTATE WASHDC INFO CAIRO DTG 3 JUL 75

FM TEL AVIV

QUOTE

SECRET TEL AVIV 4252

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECT OMISSION IN PARA 2.)

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 DECLAS 12/31/95

TAGS: PFOR, IS, US, XF

SUBJ: INTERIM SETTLEMENT - VIEWS OF YITZHAK NAVON

BEGIN SUMMARY: YITZHAK NAVON, CHAIRMAN OF KNESSET  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, HAS TOLD  
US THAT HE BELIEVES PM RABIN HAS NOT YET TAKEN  
FINAL POSITION ON INERIM SETTLEMENT, BUT HIS VIEWS,  
EITHER FOR OR AGAINST, WILL BE DECISIVE IN DETERM-  
INING WHERE GOI COMES OUT. NAVON THINKS ALMOST ANY  
SHIFT IN EGYPTIAN POSITION WOULD BE HELPFUL AND  
A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT (E.G. ON WARNING SITES) WOULD

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SWING BALANCE IN FAVOR OF AGREEMENT. NEXT BEST

WOULD BE SOME US "GESTURE" TO OFFSET WHAT IS WIDELY REGARDED HERE AS A HARSH US STANCE IN RECENT WEEKS; PERHAPS A FRIENDLY STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY GIVING SOME INDICATION OF THE VALUE US PLACES ON CONTINUATION OF CLOSE US-ISRAELI TIES.

1. NAVON TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR JULY 2 THAT IN HIS OPINION PM RABIN WAS STILL UNDECIDED ON POSITION HE WOULD TAKE IN CABINET DECISION ON INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH HE EXPECTED IN "NEXT WEEK OR 10 DAYS." THIS WOULD DEPEND ON CLARIFICATIONS SOUGHT, VIA DINITZ AND OTHERS, FROM USG. NAVON ASSERTED THAT RABIN HAS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED TO HIS KNESSET COMMITTEE IMPORTANCE OF US RELATIONSHIP TO ISRAEL IN OVERALL CALCULATIONS OF ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE WHICH AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT POSES IN ISRAELI EYES. HE THINKS RABIN'S FEBRUARY COMMITMENT TO KNESSET NOT TO GIVE UP PASSES FOR LESS THAN NON-BELLIGERENCY WAS A MISTAKE--WHICH PM NOW RECOGNIZED WAS HEMMING HIM IN. IT ALSO HAD LED TO OVEREMPHASIS ON IMPORTANCE OF PASSES TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, BOTH TO PUBLIC AND IN RABIN'S OWN THINKING. NAVON SAID THAT HAWKISH OPPONENTS OF AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT HAD SO DISTORTED SECURITY ARGUMENT IN RECENT DAYS THAT HE HAD FELT IMPELLED TO BRING SOME REALISM INTO NATIONAL DEBATE BY MAKING CLEAR--AS HE FORTHRIGHTLY DID ON JUNE 30, THAT VALUE TO ISRAEL OF CONTINUED CLOSE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPLY LINKS WITH THE US WAS OF INCOMPARABLY GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN PASSES. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN VIGOROUSLY ATTACKED BY MANY OF HIS POLITICAL FRIENDS FOR HAVING SPOKEN OUT ON GROUNDS, AMONG OTHERS, THAT THIS WOULD ENCOURAGE EGYPT NOT TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS. NAVON SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THIS ARGUMENT, BUT WAS CONVINCED THAT TIME HAD ARRIVED TO PLAY ISRAEL'S CARDS AND HE HAD DONE RIGHT THING IN CIRCUMSTANCES.

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2. ADDRESSING QUESTION OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR GOVT WHICHEVER WAY DECISION WENT, NAVON OFFERED FOLLOWING VIEWS. IF NEGOTIATING TRIUMVIRATE (RABIN, PERES, ALLON) ALL AGREED TO INTERIM SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD BE ACCEPTED OVERWHELMINGLY BY CABINET AND KNESSET. IF RABIN AND ALLON WERE FOR AND PERES WAS AGAINST, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCEPTED IN THE CABINET, BUT WOULD BE A CLOSE THING IN KNESSET.

HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD SPLIT RAFI MK'S, FOR EXAMPLE.  
IN ANY CASE, NAVON THOUGHT KEY QUESTION WAS POSITION  
OF RABIN HIMSELF, WHOSE POLITICAL STATURE HAD  
INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY IN RECENT MONTHS AND  
WHOSE AUTHORITY ON MILITARY MATTERS WOULD CARRY  
EIGHT. THOUGH HE WOULD DEEPLY REGRET, AND WOULD  
PERSONALLY OPPOSE, A DECISION AGAINST  
AN AGREEMENT (HOWEVER "BAD") NAVON DID NOT  
SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT RESISTANCE RABIN WOULD FACE  
FROM DOVISH AND MIDDLE GROUND CABINET MEMBERS  
AND MK'S WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO REVERSE DECISION  
AND CAUSE BREAKDOWN OF GOVT COALITION. CERTAINLY  
NOT IN SHORT TERM.

3. NAVON THEN EXPRESSED OPINION THAT IN ITS PRESENT  
BIND, GOI WAS ALMOST DESPERATELY EAGER FOR SOME  
MOVEMENT ON EGYPTIAN SIDE--AND FAILING THAT SOME  
US ACTION--WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE A "BREAK-  
THROUGH" ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF AN AGREEMENT. HE  
ADDED THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY MERELY FOR  
POLITICAL AMOUR PROPRE OF ISRAELI PRINCIPALS,  
BUT RATHER THAT RECENT EVENTS--RABIN VISIT, DINITZ  
CALLS ON PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY--HAD REVEALED  
SHOCKINGLY HARSH US DEMANDS IN VIW OF ISRAELIS  
WHO FELT RESENTFUL AT THIS (ALLEGED TREATMENT)  
AND ANGRY AT WHAT THEY TOOK TO BE AN ULTIMATUM  
THAT THE ISRAELI RESPONSE IN MATTER WOULD HAVE  
TO BE RECEIVED BEFORE END OF JUNE. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION,  
NAVON CONCEDED THAT TIME FACTOR COULD CONDITION  
WHOLE NDAOIATING PICTURE AND THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND HOW SOME  
AMERICANS MIGHT THINK ISRAEL USED TACTICS WHICH WOULD DELAY  
HARD DECISIONS. HE ALSO AGREED GOI HAD PERMITTED ITS OWN  
INITIAL NEGATIVE REACTION TO US POLICY "REQUIREMENTS" TO GET  
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ALMOST DANGEROUSLY OUT OF CONTROL IN PRESS OVER WEEKEND.  
DESPITE THIS, HE SAID, IT WAS HIS JUDGMENT THAT  
SOME FURTHR US ACTION--HERE HE PRAISED PRESIDENT  
STATEMENT THAT US APPROACHES WERE BY NO MEANS  
ULTIMATIVE--EVEN COSMETIC ACTION, COULD PLAY  
EXTREMELY SIGNIFICANT ROLE WHEN DECISION MAKING  
TIME ARRIVED. HE ASKED THAT THIS VIEW BE PASSED  
ALONG. WE ASSURED HIM IT WOULD BE.  
TOON  
UNQUOTE  
INGERSOLL

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NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
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**TAGS:** PFOR, IS, US, XF, (NAVON, YITZHAK)  
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